H.R. 031 | Establishing a select committee to investigate and report on the pardon of Edward Joseph Snowden

[Brink]

Mr. Guenther proposes for himself and others a

Resolution

Establishing a select committee to investigate and report on the pardon of Edward Joseph Snowden by President Kyle Van Horn

Resolved, That

SECTION 1. Establishment.
There is hereby established a select Committee to investigate and report on the pardon of Edward Joseph Snowden by President Kyle Van Horn (hereinafter referred to as the “select committee”).

SECTION. 2. Composition.
(a) The select committee shall be composed of 19 members as follows:
(1) The chair and ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services (or a designee from among the members of that committee).
(2) The chair and ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (or a designee from among the members of that committee).
(3) The chair and ranking member of the Committee on Homeland Security (or a designee from among the members of that committee).
(4) The chair and ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (or a designee from among the members of that committee).
(5) The chair and ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary (or a designee from among the members of that committee).
(6) The chair and ranking member of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (or a designee from among the members of that committee).
(7) Five members appointed by the Speaker.
If the chair or ranking member of any such committee declines to serve on the select committee, then the Speaker in the case of a chair, or the Speaker after consultation with the minority leader in the case of a ranking member, shall designate the member or members from that committee to serve on the select committee.
(b) The Speaker shall designate one member as chairman and the minority leader shall designate one member as the ranking minority member of the select committee.

SECTION. 3. Investigation and report on the attack on the pardon of Edward Joseph Snowden by President Kyle Van Horn.
Not later than 90 days after the initial meeting of the select committee, the select committee shall conduct an investigation of and submit to the House a report on—
(1) the testimony of the Office of the Pardon Attorney at the Department of Justice regarding the pardon, whether President Van Horn and the Administration sought the recommendation of the OPA, and whether such recommendations were followed;
(2) the testimony of the Attorney General of the United States regarding his role in the pardon, whether President Van Horn and the Administration sought his recommendation, and whether said recommendations was followed;
(3) the testimony of the Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence, Secretary of the Treasury, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, the National Security Advisor, National Security Council Senior Director for Europe, National Security Council Director for Russia, and former Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly regarding the diplomatic, intelligence, and national security ramifications of the pardon, their respective opinions or recommendations to the President, and their role in the pardon process;
(4) communications with foreign leaders, intelligence, diplomats, emissaries, or the like by President Van Horn or other Administration officials regarding the pardon of Edward Joseph Snowden;
(5) the final opinion of the Select Committee on whether President Van Horn's pardon was justified.

SECTION 4. Procedures of the select committee.
Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, including clause 2(j)(1) (guaranteeing the minority additional witnesses) and clause 2(m)(3) (providing for the authority to subpoena witnesses and documents), shall apply to the select committee.

SECTION 5. Joint operations.
The chair of the select committee, in conducting the investigation described in section 3, may consult with the chair of any Senate committee conducting a parallel investigation regarding meeting jointly to receive testimony, the scheduling of hearings or issuance of subpoenas, and joint staff interviews of key witnesses.

SECTION 6. Staff; funding.
(a)(1) To the extent practicable, the select committee shall utilize the services of staff of employing entities of the House. At the request of the chair in consultation with the ranking minority member, staff of employing entities of the House may be detailed to the select committee to carry out this resolution and shall be deemed to be staff of the select committee.(2) The chair, upon consultation with the ranking minority member, may employ and fix the compensation of such staff as the chair considers necessary to carry out this resolution.(b) There are authorized to be appropriated from the applicable accounts of the House such sums as may be necessary to carry out this resolution. Payments for the expenses of the select committee shall be made on vouchers signed by the chairman and approved in the manner directed by the Committee on House Administration. Amounts made available under this subsection shall be expended in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Committee on House Administration.

SEC. 7. Dissolution and disposition of records.
(a) The select committee shall cease to exist 30 days after filing the report required under section 3.
(b) Upon dissolution of the select committee, the records of the select committee shall become the records of any committee designated by the Speaker.

 

Quote

PES: Establishes a House Select Committee to investigate the pardon of Edward J. Snowden by President Kyle Van Horn.

 

Edited December 22, 2024 by Brink

[Brink]

The House shall come to order to debate this resolution for a period of 72 hours.

[Brink]

The House shall vote on this legislation for a period of 36 hours.

[Elizabeth Hunt R-AL]

Nay

[jakeakins]

blue dogs: aye

[camilodeso]

New dems: aye

[Goldie]

Main Street: Nay

[Abrams]

Nay.

[Brink]

The House has passed this resolution in a 221-212 vote and the select committee will be established.

[Vesica]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides the findings of the Select Committee tasked with investigating the pardon of Edward Joseph Snowden by President Kyle Van Horn. The investigation focused on the process and decision-making behind the pardon, potential breaches of standard protocols, and the implications for national security and foreign relations.

Key findings include the absence of consultation with the Office of the Pardon Attorney (OPA), the use of executive privilege to shield critical discussions, testimony regarding the significant diplomatic, intelligence, and national security ramifications, and evidence that the decision originated solely from the White House.

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FINDINGS

1. Absence of Advice from the Office of the Pardon Attorney

• Testimony and Evidence:

  • The committee found no evidence that the OPA was consulted regarding the pardon of Edward Snowden.

  • Communications from the Department of Justice confirm that the Attorney General’s office received a directive from the White House indicating that the pardon would be issued without seeking advice or recommendations from the OPA.

• Analysis:

  • This represents a significant deviation from established norms and practices, which typically involve OPA input to ensure thorough vetting of pardon decisions.

2. Invocation of Executive Privilege

• Testimony:

  • The Attorney General and senior White House officials invoked executive privilege to avoid answering questions about their conversations with the President regarding the pardon.

  • Key witnesses, including the Secretary of State, Director of National Intelligence, and Director of Central Intelligence, also invoked executive privilege when asked if their advice was sought prior to the pardon.

• Notable Exception:

  • Former Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly testified unequivocally that his advice and opinion were not sought regarding the pardon.

3. Ramifications of the Pardon

• Testimony:

  • Witnesses unanimously acknowledged the significant diplomatic, intelligence, and national security implications of the pardon:

    • The Secretary of State testified that European allies have raised concerns about trust and intelligence-sharing agreements.

    • The Director of National Intelligence reported widespread dissatisfaction across all 17 intelligence agencies.

    • The Director of Central Intelligence highlighted internal disruptions, including near-resignations at the upper and middle levels of CIA leadership.

• Diplomatic Impact:

  • The U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Lynne Tracy, confirmed that Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, expressed surprise but generally viewed the pardon positively.

  • Ambassador Tracy testified that she did not offer an opinion on the pardon, stating her role is to execute U.S. policy, not comment on it. She also personally signed off on Snowden’s new passport.

  • The review of State Department emails indicates career Foreign Service Officers largely refrained from commenting, while political appointees, regardless of their prior affiliations, expressed more heated opinions.

4. Communications with Foreign Leaders

• Findings:

  • Limited evidence was found of pre-pardon communications between the administration and foreign leaders. Diplomats testified to a lack of preparation or guidance regarding how to address inquiries from counterparts following the pardon.

  • Emails between the Secretary of State and Ambassador Tracy suggest that the Russian government was as surprised by the pardon as the U.S. intelligence community.

5. No Evidence of Foreign Influence

• Testimony and Analysis:

  • The investigation found no evidence that foreign influence played a role in the President’s decision to pardon Edward Snowden.

  • All available testimony and documentation indicate that the decision originated solely from within the White House.

6. State Department Analysis

• Findings:

  • Career Foreign Service Officers, both domestically and internationally, largely refrained from commenting on the pardon in traceable communications.

  • Political appointees, irrespective of their alignment with prior administrations, displayed more polarized reactions.

  • The State Department emails further validate Ambassador Tracy’s testimony, reflecting that her professionalism ensured the decision had no negative impact on Embassy operations or staff morale. Her decorum was uniform amongst most Embassies where Career Foreign Service Officers had the lead. 

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CONCLUSIONS

The Select Committee concludes that the pardon of Edward Snowden was executed with minimal consultation and without adherence to standard protocols, resulting in significant repercussions:

• Process: The lack of consultation with the OPA undermined procedural integrity. The use of executive privilege has impeded transparency and accountability.

• National Security: Testimony from intelligence and defense officials underscores the substantial harm to U.S. intelligence operations, staff morale, and international cooperation.

• Diplomacy: The pardon has strained key alliances, created uncertainty among allies, and provided adversaries with propaganda opportunities.

While the decision to pardon ultimately falls solely within the purview of the Presidency, the ramifications of this action highlight the need for procedural safeguards and transparent decision-making processes. The Committee can not state whether or not the pardon was justified; the power of clemency by the President of the United States is without question, and ultimately, any pardon need only be justified by the President.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Strengthen Pardon Protocols:

   • Legislate requirements for consultation with the OPA in all pardon cases involving national security implications.

2. Enhance Transparency:

   • Review the scope of executive privilege to ensure it is not used to obscure critical decision-making processes.

3. Rebuild Trust:

   • Engage in high-level diplomatic outreach to reassure allies and reaffirm commitments to intelligence-sharing and joint security initiatives.

4. Internal Reforms:

   • Conduct a comprehensive review of the intelligence community’s policies to address staff retention and morale in the wake of this pardon.