Jump to content

Recommended Posts

Posted (edited)
Mrs. Kahiona for herself (with special thanks to Mr. Menendez) ntroduced the following bill
A BILL

To counter the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and Eastern European allies, to expedite security assistance to Ukraine to bolster Ukraine's defense capabilities, and to impose sanctions relating to the actions of the Russian Federation with respect to Ukraine, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

 

SECTION 1. Short title; table of contents.

(a) Short title.—This Act may be cited as the “Defending Ukraine Sovereignty Act of 2025”.

(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:


Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.


Sec. 101. Prioritizing delivery of excess defense articles to Ukraine.
Sec. 102. Use of Department of Defense lease authority and Special Defense Acquisition Fund to support Ukraine.
Sec. 103. Strategy for bolstering defensive capacities of Ukraine and enhancing delivery of security assistance.
Sec. 104. Presidential drawdown authority.
Sec. 105. Foreign Military Financing.
Sec. 106. International Military Education and Training cooperation with Ukraine.
Sec. 107. Strategy on International Military Education and Training programming in Ukraine.
Sec. 108. Sense of Congress on loan program.
Sec. 109. Report on security assistance and provision of defense articles to armed forces of Ukraine.


Sec. 201. Authorizing programs to counter and combat disinformation activities of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 202. Expanded support and authorization for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to reach audiences on the periphery of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 203. Multilateral efforts to bolster Ukraine’s cyber defense capabilities.
Sec. 204. Report on role of intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation in efforts to undermine the independence and integrity of Ukraine.
Sec. 205. Strategy for forum on European security.
Sec. 206. Deepening security and economic ties with Baltic allies.
Sec. 207. Public disclosure of assets of Vladimir Putin and his inner circle.
Sec. 208. Briefing to fulfill United States-Ukraine strategic dialogue objectives.


Sec. 301. Definitions.
Sec. 302. Determination with respect to operations of the Russian Federation in Ukraine.
Sec. 303. Imposition of sanctions with respect to officials of the Government of the Russian Federation relating to operations in Ukraine.
Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian financial institutions.
Sec. 305. Imposition of sanctions with respect to provision of specialized financial messaging services to sanctioned Russian financial institutions.
Sec. 306. Prohibition on and imposition of sanctions with respect to transactions involving Russian sovereign debt.
Sec. 307. Department of State review of sanctions with respect to Nord Stream 2.
Sec. 308. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Nord Stream 2.
Sec. 309. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian extractive industries.
Sec. 310. Sanctions described.
Sec. 311. Implementation; regulations; penalties.
Sec. 312. Exceptions; waiver.
Sec. 313. Termination.


Sec. 401. Sunset.
Sec. 402. Exception relating to importation of goods.

 

SEC. 2. Definitions.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) DEFENSE ARTICLE; DEFENSE SERVICE.—The terms “defense article” and “defense service” have the meanings given those terms in section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794).

 

SEC. 3. Sense of Congress.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) it is in the national security interests of the United States to continue and deepen the security partnership between the United States and Ukraine, and support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;

(2) aggression and malign influence by the Government of the Russian Federation and its proxies in Ukraine is a threat to the democratic sovereignty of Ukraine;

(3) in coordination with the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and members of the international community, the United States should support the territorial integrity of Ukraine and oppose any effort by the Government of the Russian Federation to further encroach on Ukraine’s territory and independence;

(4) the United States should work in close concert with allies and partners of the United States—

(A) to support and expedite the provision of lethal and non-lethal assistance to Ukraine; and

(B) to support and bolster the defense of Ukraine against potential renewed aggression and military escalation by the Government of the Russian Federation or through any of its proxies;

(5) the United States and NATO should not cede to the demands of the Government of the Russian Federation regarding NATO membership or expansion;

(6) economic and financial sanctions, when used as part of a coordinated and comprehensive strategy, are a powerful tool to advance United States foreign policy and national security interests; and

(7) the United States, in coordination with allies and partners of the United States, should impose substantial new sanctions in the event that the Government of the Russian Federation or its proxies engages in escalatory military operations or other destabilizing aggression against Ukraine.

 

SEC. 4. Statement of policy.

It is the policy of the United States that—

(1) the United States will support the territorial integrity of Ukraine and other Eastern European countries against aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation or its proxies;

(2) the United States will work to ensure the swift and ongoing provision of lethal and non-lethal security assistance to Ukraine, particularly so long as the Government of the Russian Federation or its proxies has armed forces within the territorial borders of Ukraine or stationed near Ukraine’s border;

(3) the United States will continue to build the resiliency of Ukraine’s military and cyber defenses and bolster Ukraine’s ability to defend against aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation;

(4) the United States will continue to improve Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO forces and seek to further enhance security cooperation and engagement with and among partners in the Black Sea and Baltic region;

(5) the United States will work closely with regional partners, including those in the Black Sea region and the Baltic states, to strengthen Ukrainian and regional security; and

(6) the United States is committed to a strong and unified NATO and will not cede to the demands of the Government of the Russian Federation regarding NATO membership.

 

 

SEC. 101. Prioritizing delivery of excess defense articles to Ukraine.

(a) In general.—During fiscal year 2025, the United States should give priority to the delivery of excess defense articles to Ukraine over the transfer of such articles to other countries and regions under section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

(b) Waiver.—The President may waive subsection (a) if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.

 

SEC. 102. Use of Department of Defense lease authority and Special Defense Acquisition Fund to support Ukraine.

(a) Use of special defense acquisition fund.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may utilize, to the maximum extent possible, the Special Defense Acquisition Fund established under section 51 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2795) to expedite the procurement and delivery of defense articles and defense services for the purpose of assisting and supporting the armed forces of Ukraine.

(b) Use of lease authority.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may utilize, to the maximum extent possible, its lease authority, including with respect to no-cost leases, to provide defense articles to Ukraine for the purpose of assisting and supporting the armed forces of Ukraine.

 

SEC. 103. Strategy for bolstering defensive capacities of Ukraine and enhancing delivery of security assistance.

(a) In general.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, a strategy for bolstering the defensive capabilities of the armed forces of Ukraine and enhancing the delivery of security assistance to Ukraine, which shall include the following:

(1) A plan to meet the most critical capability gaps and capacity shortfalls of the armed forces of Ukraine.

(2) A plan for United States cooperation with allies and partners to provide immediate assistance to the armed forces of Ukraine.

(3) A plan to prioritize the delivery of excess defense articles to Ukraine in accordance with section 101.

(4) A plan to transfer to Ukraine defense articles previously allocated for operations in Afghanistan that are available for transfer, as appropriate.

(b) Form.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.

 

SEC. 104. Presidential drawdown authority.

The authority under section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)) may be exercised during fiscal year 2025 for Ukraine to the maximum extent available for that fiscal year.

 

SEC. 105. Foreign Military Financing.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the provision of security assistance to Ukraine is one of the most efficient and effective mechanisms for supporting Ukraine and ensuring that it can defend against aggression by the Russian Federation;

(2) in light of the military build-up by the Government of the Russian Federation, the United States, working with allies and partners, should work to expedite the provision of defense articles and other security assistance to Ukraine and prioritize and facilitate assistance to respond to the most urgent defense needs of the armed forces of Ukraine; and

(3) the United States should ensure adequate planning for maintenance for any equipment provided to Ukraine.

(b) Authorization of emergency supplemental appropriations.—Upon an affirmative determination under section 302, there is authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State for fiscal year 2025 $500,000,000, as an authorization of emergency supplemental appropriations, for Foreign Military Financing assistance to Ukraine to assist the country in meeting its defense needs.

(c) Notice to Congress.—Not later than 15 days before providing assistance or support pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a notification containing the following:

(1) A detailed description of the assistance or support to be provided, including—

(A) the objectives of such assistance or support;

(B) the budget for such assistance or support; and

(C) the expected or estimated timeline for delivery of such assistance or support.

(2) A description of such other matters as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(d) Authority To provide lethal assistance.—The Secretary of State is authorized to provide lethal assistance under this section, including anti-armor weapon systems, mortars, crew-served weapons and ammunition, grenade launchers and ammunition, anti-tank weapons systems, anti-ship weapons systems, anti-aircraft weapons systems, and small arms and ammunition.

 

SEC. 106. International Military Education and Training cooperation with Ukraine.

(a) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a critical component of United States security assistance that facilitates training of international forces and strengthens cooperation and ties between the United States and foreign countries;

(2) it is in the national interest of the United States to further strengthen the armed forces of Ukraine, particularly to enhance their defensive capability and improve interoperability for joint operations; and

(3) the Government of Ukraine should fully utilize the United States IMET program, encourage eligible officers and civilian leaders to participate in the training, and promote successful graduates to positions of prominence in the armed forces of Ukraine.

(b) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for fiscal year 2025 $3,000,000 for International Military Education and Training assistance for Ukraine. The assistance shall be made available for the following purposes:

(1) Training of future leaders.

(2) Establishing a rapport between the United States Armed Forces and the armed forces of Ukraine to build partnerships for the future.

(3) Enhancement of interoperability and capabilities for joint operations.

(4) Focusing on professional military education, civilian control of the military, and human rights.

(5) Fostering a better understanding of the United States.

(c) Notice to Congress.—Not later than 15 days before providing assistance or support pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a notification containing the following elements:

(1) A detailed description of the assistance or support to be provided, including—

(A) the objectives of such assistance or support;

(B) the budget for such assistance or support; and

(C) the expected or estimated timeline for delivery of such assistance or support.

(2) A description of such other matters as the Secretary considers appropriate.

 

SEC. 107. Strategy on International Military Education and Training programming in Ukraine.

(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for the implementation of the International Military Education and Training program in Ukraine authorized under section 106.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements:

(1) A clear plan, developed in close consultation with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the armed forces of Ukraine, for how the IMET program will be used by the United States Government and the Government of Ukraine to propel program graduates to positions of prominence in support of the reform efforts of the armed forces of Ukraine in line with NATO standards.

(2) An assessment of the education and training requirements of the armed forces of Ukraine and clear recommendations for how IMET graduates should be assigned by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense upon completion of education or training.

(3) An accounting of the current combat requirements of the armed forces of Ukraine and an assessment of the viability of alternative mobile training teams, distributed learning, and other flexible solutions to reach such students.

(4) An identification of opportunities to influence the next generation of leaders through attendance at United States staff and war colleges, junior leader development programs, and technical schools.

(c) Form.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

 

SEC. 108. Sense of Congress on loan program.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) as appropriate, the United States Government should provide direct loans to Ukraine for the procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services pursuant to the authority of section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to support the further development of Ukraine’s military forces; and

(2) such loans should be considered an additive security assistance tool, and not a substitute for Foreign Military Financing for grant assistance or Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative programming.

 

SEC. 109. Report on security assistance and provision of defense articles to armed forces of Ukraine.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, a report that includes—

(1) a description of the steps the United States has taken to provide and expedite security assistance, defense articles, and any other forms of support to Ukraine and the armed forces of Ukraine, including increasing air defense capabilities, since September 1, 2021;

(2) a description of any increased assistance and support provided by allies and partners of the United States or Ukraine to Ukraine or the armed forces of Ukraine, including increasing air defense capabilities, since September 1, 2021; and

(3) a description of any plans by the United States to provide additional assistance and support to Ukraine or the armed forces of Ukraine.

 

 

SEC. 201. Authorizing programs to counter and combat disinformation activities of the Russian Federation.

(a) Countering Russian influence fund.—The Secretary of State should use funds available for obligation in the Countering Russian Influence Fund described in section 7070(d) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017 (division J of Public Law 115–31; 131 Stat. 706)—

(1) to prioritize assisting Ukraine to detect and combat disinformation from the Russian Federation and its proxies; and

(2) to assist the Government of Ukraine in developing new defense strategies and technologies.

(b) Strategy required.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for countering and combating disinformation by the Russian Federation and supporting free and independent media in Ukraine that includes—

(A) a plan to assist the Government of Ukraine in combating and responding to malign influence operations of the Russian Federation aimed at inflaming tensions and dividing Ukrainian society;

(B) an assessment of effective efforts and programs to improve media literacy in Ukraine and recommendations for how the United States can assist in supporting and expanding those programs;

(C) a plan to assist the Government of Ukraine improve efforts to detect and remove content originating from Russian troll farms, bots, and other sources aimed at sowing division and disseminating disinformation in Ukraine or targeting Ukrainian audiences;

(D) recommendations to increase support for independent media outlets, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; and

(E) recommendations to increase support for independent media outlets catering to Russian-speaking populations residing in Russian-occupied Crimea, the Donbas region of Ukraine, and throughout Ukraine.

(2) FORM.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.

 

SEC. 202. Expanded support and authorization for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to reach audiences on the periphery of the Russian Federation.

(a) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty continues to fulfill its mission of providing reliable, uncensored, and accessible news and reporting in Ukraine and other countries where media freedom is restricted;

(2) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is one of the most critical sources of unrestricted, independent news and reporting for audiences on the periphery of the Russian Federation;

(3) the Government of the Russian Federation has engaged in systematic targeting of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporters inside the Russian Federation, which has negatively impacted the organization’s ability to provide timely, reliable, and accurate news from inside the country; and

(4) despite pressure from the Government of the Russian Federation, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s audience continues to grow inside the Russian Federation and surrounding countries.

(b) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated $155,500,000 for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty for fiscal year 2025.

(c) Authorization of new bureaus.—Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty may explore opening new bureaus to help expand its ability to reach audiences on the periphery of the Russian Federation.

(d) Initiatives To bolster Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty bureaus around Russian Federation’s periphery.—To help expand its reach to Russian-speaking audiences and increase its reach to audiences through digital media, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty should—

(1) evaluate where Russian disinformation is most deeply pervasive in the Eurasia region;

(2) develop strategies to better communicate with predominately Russian-speaking regions;

(3) build on efforts to increase capacity and programming to counter disinformation in real time;

(4) expand Russian language investigative journalism;

(5) improve the technical capacity of the Ukraine bureau; and

(6) continue efforts to increase digital news services.

(e) Report required.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report that includes—

(1) recommendations of locations to open new bureaus to help reach new audiences in the broader Eurasia region;

(2) an assessment of current staffing and anticipated staffing needs in order to effectively reach audiences in the broader Eurasia region; and

(3) an assessment of the impact of the Government of the Russian Federation closing down Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty within the Russian Federation.

 

SEC. 203. Multilateral efforts to bolster Ukraine’s cyber defense capabilities.

(a) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to support multilateral, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental efforts to improve Ukraine’s cybersecurity capacity, including addressing legislative and regulatory gaps in Ukraine’s cybersecurity policies, improving cybersecurity sector governance, and expanding collaboration among relevant stakeholders in both the public and private sectors;

(2) to work with the Government of Ukraine to strengthen cybersecurity technical capacity within critical infrastructure sectors and improve the overall cybersecurity workforce by strengthening cybersecurity-related academic and training programs and exchanges;

(3) to work closely with the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, and the National Cyber Security Centre of the United Kingdom to bolster Ukraine’s cyber defense capabilities; and

(4) to strengthen the ability of the Government of Ukraine to detect, investigate, disrupt, and deter cyberattacks and to develop cybersecurity incident response teams.

(b) Report required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on efforts to implement the policy described in subsection (a).

(c) Evaluation of imposition of sanctions.—In the event the Government of the Russian Federation or any of its proxies engages in a cyberattack or cyber incident that materially disrupts or degrades any critical infrastructure in Ukraine, the President shall evaluate whether imposing any of the sanctions described in section 310 is in the national security interests of the United States.

 

SEC. 204. Report on role of intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation in efforts to undermine the independence and integrity of Ukraine.

(a) In general.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, a report on the role of the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation in efforts to undermine and interfere with the independence of Ukraine.

(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include—

(1) an assessment of the priorities and objectives of the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation with respect to Ukraine;

(2) a detailed description of the steps taken by any intelligence or security services of the Russian Federation to undermine the stability of Ukraine or the Government of Ukraine;

(3) a complete list of the branches of the intelligence or security services of the Russian Federation that have engaged in any influence efforts or campaigns to undermine the stability of Ukraine or the Government of Ukraine;

(4) an assessment of—

(A) the tactics and techniques used by any intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation with respect to Ukraine; and

(B) the success of those tactics and techniques; and

(5) any plans by the United States to provide additional support to the Government of Ukraine to prevent internal destabilization efforts, including through intelligence sharing and support for reforms and anti-corruption efforts.

 

SEC. 205. Strategy for forum on European security.

(a) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States should work closely with NATO allies, particularly those that share a border with the Russian Federation, on any matters related to European security; and

(2) the United States Mission to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (commonly referred to as the “OSCE”) should—

(A) support an inclusive European security dialogue that calls on OSCE participating states to comply with principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and the Charter of the United Nations; and

(B) continue to publicly call for the Government of the Russian Federation to adhere to its commitments as an OSCE participating state.

(b) Strategy on European security.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for continued engagement with the Government of the Russian Federation following January 2025 security dialogues, including the Strategic Stability Dialogue in Geneva, the NATO-Russia Council Meeting in Brussels, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Permanent Council Meeting in Vienna, which shall include—

(1) an assessment of whether the Government of the Russian Federation has sufficiently de-escalated regional tensions, including through a significant withdrawal of troops from the border of Ukraine, to merit further discussion;

(2) an assessment of the objectives of the Government of the Russian Federation related to European security;

(3) a plan to reduce tensions between the Russian Federation and Eastern European allies, taking into account the perspectives of a wide cross section of European allies of the United States; and

(4) a plan for including Eastern European NATO allies, specifically those that share a border with the Russian Federation, in any conversations on European security.

(c) Form.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.

 

SEC. 206. Deepening security and economic ties with Baltic allies.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) supporting and bolstering the security of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is in the national security interests of the United States;

(2) the Baltic states are critical in countering aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation and maintaining the collective security of the NATO alliance;

(3) the United States should continue to support and foster a security partnership with the Baltic states that aims to meet their security needs and provides additional capabilities and tools to help defend against aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation in the region;

(4) the United States should encourage the initiative undertaken by the Baltic states to advance the Three Seas Initiative to strengthen transport, energy, and digital infrastructures among eastern Europe countries;

(5) there are mutually beneficial opportunities for increased investment and economic expansion between the United States and the Baltic states; and

(6) improved economic ties between the United States and the Baltic states will lead to a strengthened strategic partnership.

(b) Baltic security and economic enhancement initiative.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall establish an initiative to deepen and foster security and economic ties with the Baltic states.

(2) PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES.—The initiative established under paragraph (1) shall have the following goals and objectives:

(A) Ensuring the efficient and effective delivery of security assistance to the Baltic states, prioritizing assistance that will bolster defenses against hybrid warfare and improve interoperability with NATO forces.

(B) Bolstering United States support for the Baltic region’s physical and energy security needs.

(C) Mitigating the impact of economic coercion by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on Baltic states and identifying new opportunities for foreign direct investment and United States business ties.

(D) Improving high-level engagement between the United States and the Baltic states, with a focus on improving high-level security and economic cooperation.

(3) ACTIVITIES.—The initiative established under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) develop a comprehensive security assistance strategy to strengthen the defensive capabilities of the Baltic states, in coordination with other security assistance authorities, that takes into account the unique challenges of the proximity of the Baltic states to the Russian Federation and the threat of aggression against the Baltic states from the Government of the Russian Federation;

(B) encourage the United States International Development Finance Corporation to identify new opportunities for investment in the Baltic states;

(C) send high-level representatives of the Department of State to—

(i) the Baltic states not less frequently than twice a year; and

(ii) major regional fora on physical and energy security, including the Three Seas Initiative Summit and Business Forum and the Baltic Sea Security Conference;

(D) convene an annual trade forum, in coordination with the governments of Baltic states, to foster investment opportunities in the Baltic region for United States businesses; and

(E) foster dialogue between experts from the United States and from the Baltic states on hybrid warfare, cyber defenses, economic expansion, and foreign direct investment.

 

SEC. 207. Public disclosure of assets of Vladimir Putin and his inner circle.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the committees specified in subsection (d) a detailed report on the personal net worth and assets of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and his inner circle.

(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include—

(1) an identification of significant senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, as determined by their closeness to Vladimir Putin;

(2) the estimated net worth and known sources of income of the individuals identified under paragraph (1), Vladimir Putin, and the family members of such individuals and Vladimir Putin (including spouses, children, parents, and siblings), including assets, investments, bank accounts, business interests, held in and outside of the Russian Federation, and relevant beneficial ownership information;

(3) an estimate of the total annual income and personal expenditures of Vladimir Putin and his family members for calendar years 2017 through 2024; and

(4) all known details about the financial practices and transparency, or lack thereof, of Vladimir Putin and the individuals identified under paragraph (1).

(c) Form.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(2) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) shall be made available on a publicly accessible internet website.

(d) Committees specified.—The committees specified in this subsection are—

(1) the appropriate congressional committees;

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(3) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

 

SEC. 208. Briefing to fulfill United States-Ukraine strategic dialogue objectives.

(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on efforts to deepen ties with Ukraine and fully implement the objectives outlined in the United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba on November 10, 2021.

(b) Elements.—The briefing required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A plan to bolster support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders, including plans for high-level representation and robust participation in Ukraine’s Crimea Platform.

(2) A plan to highlight human rights abuses by the Government of the Russian Federation in Ukrainian territory, which shall include mechanisms to draw attention to persecuted minorities and political prisoners in Crimea and the Donbas.

(3) An assessment of humanitarian assistance needs for those affected or displaced by the war in Donbas.

(4) A plan to support democracy and the rule of law in Ukraine, which shall include efforts to build on progress made on the establishment of anti-corruption institutions, land reform, local governance, and digitalization.

 

 

SEC. 301. Definitions.

In this title:

(1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

(2) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(3) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “financial institution” means a financial institution specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (M), or (Y) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code.

(4) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “foreign financial institution” has the meaning given that term in regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.

(5) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign person” means an individual or entity that is not a United States person.

(6) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly” with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person had actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(7) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

 

SEC. 302. Determination with respect to operations of the Russian Federation in Ukraine.

(a) In general.—The President shall determine, at such times as are required under subsection (b), whether—

(1) the Government of the Russian Federation, including through any of its proxies, is engaged in or knowingly supporting a significant escalation in hostilities or hostile action in or against Ukraine, compared to the level of hostilities or hostile action in or against Ukraine prior to December 1, 2021; and

(2) if so, whether such escalation has the aim or effect of undermining, overthrowing, or dismantling the Government of Ukraine, occupying the territory of Ukraine, or interfering with the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine.

(b) Timing of determinations.—The President shall make the determination described in subsection (a)—

(1) not later than 15 days after the date of the enactment of this Act;

(2) after the first determination under paragraph (1), every 90 days (or more frequently as warranted) during the one-year period beginning on such date of enactment; and

(3) after the end of that one-year period, every 120 days.

(c) Report required.—Upon making a determination under this section, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, a report on the determination.

 

SEC. 303. Imposition of sanctions with respect to officials of the Government of the Russian Federation relating to operations in Ukraine.

(a) In general.—Upon making an affirmative determination under section 302 and not later than 60 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to each of the officials specified in subsection (b).

(b) Officials specified.—The officials specified in this subsection are the following:

(1) The President of the Russian Federation.

(2) The Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

(3) The Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.

(4) The Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.

(5) The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

(6) The Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of the Russian Federation.

(7) The Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation.

(8) The Commander of the Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation.

(9) The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the Russian Federation.

(10) The Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation.

(11) The Commander of the Special Operations Forces of the Russian Federation.

(12) The Commander of Logistical Support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

(c) Additional officials.—

(1) LIST REQUIRED.—Not later than 30 days after making an affirmative determination under section 302 and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of foreign persons that the President determines—

(A) are—

(i) senior officials of any branch of the armed forces of the Russian Federation leading any of the operations described in section 302; or

(ii) senior officials of the Government of the Russian Federation, including any intelligence agencies or security services of the Russian Federation, with significant roles in planning or implementing such operations; and

(B) with respect to which sanctions should be imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States.

(2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Upon the submission of each list required by paragraph (1), the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to each foreign person on the list.

 

SEC. 304. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian financial institutions.

(a) Imposition of sanctions.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative determination under section 302 and not later than 30 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with respect to 3 or more of the following financial institutions:

(A) Sberbank.

(B) VTB.

(C) Gazprombank.

(D) VEB.RF.

(E) The Russian Direct Investment Fund.

(F) Credit Bank of Moscow.

(G) Alfa Bank.

(H) Rosselkhozbank.

(I) FC Bank Otkritie.

(J) Promsvyazbank.

(K) Sovcombank.

(L) Transkapitalbank.

(2) SUBSIDIARIES AND SUCCESSOR ENTITIES.—The President may impose the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with respect to any subsidiary of, or successor entity to, a financial institution specified in paragraph (1).

(b) Additional Russian financial institutions.—

(1) LIST REQUIRED.—Not later than 30 days after making an affirmative determination under section 302, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of foreign persons that the President determines—

(A) are significant financial institutions owned or operated by the Government of the Russian Federation; and

(B) should be sanctioned in the interest of United States national security.

(2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Upon the submission of each list required by paragraph (1), the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with respect to each foreign person identified on the list.

 

SEC. 305. Imposition of sanctions with respect to provision of specialized financial messaging services to sanctioned Russian financial institutions.

(a) List of providers of specialized financial messaging services to russian financial institutions.—Not later than 60 days after making an affirmative determination under section 302, and not later than 30 days after the submission of any list of Russian financial institutions under section 304(b)(1), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of all known persons that provide specialized financial messaging services to, or that enable or facilitate access to such services for, any financial institution specified in subsection (a) of section 304 or on the list required by subsection (b) of that section.

(b) Report on efforts To terminate the provision of specialized financial messaging services for sanctioned russian financial institutions.—Not later than 90 days after the imposition of any sanctions under section 304, and every 30 days thereafter as necessary, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that—

(1) describes the status of efforts to ensure that the termination of the provision of specialized financial messaging services to, and the enabling and facilitation of access to such services for, any financial institution with respect to which sanctions are imposed under section 304; and

(2) identifies any other provider of specialized financial messaging services that continues to provide messaging services to, or enables or facilitates access to such services for, any such financial institution.

(c) Authorization for the imposition of sanctions.—If, on or after the date that is 90 days after the imposition of any sanctions under section 304, a provider of financial specialized financial messaging services continues to knowingly provide specialized financial messaging services to, or knowingly enable or facilitate direct or indirect access to such messaging services for, any financial institution with respect to which sanctions are imposed under section 304, the President may impose sanctions pursuant to that section or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with respect to that provider.

(d) Enabling or facilitation of access to specialized financial messaging services through intermediary financial institutions.—For purposes of this section, enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to specialized financial messaging services includes doing so by serving as an intermediary financial institution with access to such messaging services.

(e) Form of lists and reports.—Each list required by subsection (a) and each report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

 

SEC. 306. Prohibition on and imposition of sanctions with respect to transactions involving Russian sovereign debt.

(a) Prohibition on transactions.—Upon making an affirmative determination under section 302 and not later than 30 days following such a determination, the President shall prohibit all transactions by United States persons involving the sovereign debt of the Government of the Russian Federation issued on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, including governmental bonds.

(b) Imposition of sanctions with respect to state-owned enterprises.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after making an affirmative determination under section 302, the President shall identify and impose the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to foreign persons that the President determines engage in transactions involving the debt—

(A) of not less than 10 entities owned or controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation; and

(B) that is not subject to any other sanctions imposed by the United States.

(2) APPLICABILITY.—Sanctions imposed under paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to debt of an entity described in subparagraph (A) of that paragraph that is issued after the date that is 90 days after the President makes an affirmative determination under section 302.

(c) List; imposition of sanctions.—Not later than 30 days after making an affirmative determination under section 302, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall—

(1) submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of foreign persons that the President determines are engaged in transactions described in subsection (a); and

(2) impose the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to each such person.

 

SEC. 307. Department of State review of sanctions with respect to Nord Stream 2.

(a) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is a tool of malign influence of the Russian Federation and if it becomes operational, it will embolden the Russian Federation to further pressure and destabilize Ukraine; and

(2) the United States should consider all available and appropriate measures to prevent the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from becoming operational, including through sanctions with respect to entities and individuals responsible for planning, constructing, or operating the pipeline, and through diplomatic efforts.

(b) Department of State review of sanctions on Nord Stream 2.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall review whether the May 19, 2021, waiver regarding sanctions with respect to Nord Stream 2 AG and the chief executive officer of Nord Stream 2 AG remains in the best interest of United States national security, especially in light of the Russian Federation’s military build-up along the border of Ukraine.

 

SEC. 308. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Nord Stream 2.

Upon making an affirmative determination under section 302 and not later than 30 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to a foreign person that is—

(1) any entity established for or responsible for the planning, construction, or operation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline or a successor entity; and

(2) any corporate officer of an entity described in paragraph (1).

 

SEC. 309. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian extractive industries.

(a) Identification.—Not later than 60 days after making an affirmative determination under section 302, the President shall identify foreign persons in any of the sectors or industries described in subsection (b) that the President determines should be sanctioned in the interest of United States national security.

(b) Sectors and industries described.—The sectors and industries described in this subsection are the following:

(1) Oil and gas extraction and production.

(2) Coal extraction, mining, and production.

(3) Minerals extraction and processing.

(4) Any other sector or industry with respect to which the President determines the imposition of sanctions is in the United States national security interest.

(c) List; imposition of sanctions.—Not later than 90 days after making an affirmative determination under section 302, the President shall—

(1) submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of the persons identified under subsection (a); and

(2) impose the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to each such person.

 

SEC. 310. Sanctions described.

The sanctions to be imposed with respect to a foreign person under this title are the following:

(1) PROPERTY BLOCKING.—The President shall exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) ALIENS INADMISSIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—In the case of an alien, the alien is—

(i) inadmissible to the United States;

(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subparagraph (A) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under clause (i) shall—

(I) take effect immediately; and

(II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien’s possession.

 

SEC. 311. Implementation; regulations; penalties.

(a) Implementation.—The President may exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this title.

(b) Regulations.—The President shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as are necessary to carry out this title.

(c) Penalties.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this Act or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this title shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

 

SEC. 312. Exceptions; waiver.

(a) Exceptions.—

(1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.—This title shall not apply with respect to activities subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(2) EXCEPTION FOR COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this title shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary—

(A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success on June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or

(B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

(b) National security waiver.—The President may waive the imposition of sanctions under this title with respect to a person if the President—

(1) determines that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and

(2) submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a notification of the waiver and the reasons for the waiver.

 

SEC. 313. Termination.

The President may terminate the sanctions imposed under this title after determining and certifying to the appropriate committees of Congress that the Government of the Russian Federation has—

(1) verifiably withdrawn all of its forces from Ukrainian territory that was not occupied or subject to control by forces or proxies of the Government of the Russian Federation prior to December 1, 2021;

(2) ceased supporting proxies in Ukrainian territory described in paragraph (1); and

(3) entered into an agreed settlement with a legitimate democratic government of Ukraine.

 

 

SEC. 401. Sunset.

(a) Titles I and II.—The provisions of titles I and II shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) Title III.—The provisions of title III shall terminate on the date that is 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

 

SEC. 402. Exception relating to importation of goods.

(a) In general.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions under this Act shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(b) Good defined.—In this section, the term “good” means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.

 

PES:

This bill authorizes security assistance for Ukraine, requires sanctions against Russia if it escalates hostilities in or against Ukraine, and addresses related issues.

The bill (1) authorizes the Department of Defense to use various authorities to provide and expedite the delivery of defense articles to support Ukraine's armed forces, (2) allows the President to exercise drawdown authority to provide defense articles to Ukraine, and (3) authorizes the Department of State to provide International Military Education and Training assistance to Ukraine.

The President must periodically determine whether Russia's government is significantly escalating hostilities in or against Ukraine and whether such an escalation has the aim or effect of undermining Ukraine's government or interfering with Ukraine's sovereignty or territorial integrity. If the President determines that Russia's government has engaged in such escalation, the President must impose sanctions on (1) certain government officials, including Russia's president and prime minister; (2) certain Russian financial institutions; (3) entities involved in certain transactions involving Russian debt; (4) entities (and corporate officers of such entities) involved in constructing or operating Russia's Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline; and (5) certain entities involved in Russian resource extraction industries.

The President may terminate such sanctions after certifying to Congress that Russia's government has taken certain actions, such as entering into an agreed settlement with Ukraine's legitimate democratic government.

The bill also authorizes Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to explore opening new bureaus to reach new audiences on Russia's periphery.

The State Department must establish an initiative to deepen and foster ties with the Baltic states.

Edited by Alaskansockeyepuffs

 

2024 Democratic Nominee for President &

Senator from Hawaii: Hannah Trujillo Kahiona
Bio - Press Office - www.kahiona.senate.gov

I hope that the Bush family finds inner peace and a meditative spirit during this trying time - Mark Tennington

R8: Kasper Braun (R-VT)

R9: Katherine Lawrence (R-ID)(Senate Majority WHIP and Presidential Candidate)

R10: Veronica Kalua (D-HI)

R11: Luke Doolittle (R-AK)- (The great Flip-Flopper of the GOP) Jessica Hunt (R-AK) (RNC Chairwomen and Senate Minority Whip)(Survived as GOP Leadership)

R12: Sarah Warmbier (R-WA-4th) - Administator Scenarios Coordinator

R13: Vice President Sarah Johansen (Martyr to China) - Larry Angelouplos (R-NE) (Lazy Larry) - Mark Tennington (D-OR) (Never Get High on Your own Bowtie)(Senate Majority Whip)

R14: Anney Iyal (D-WA)

R15: Katherine Lawerence (R-ID) 2.0 , Mark Tennington (D-OR) 2.0

,R15-R16: Domestic Scenarios Coordinator,

R-17: Jennifer Stohl (R-MT)

R-18: Anney Iyal (D-WA) (Senate Majority Whip  and President Pro-Tempore) Senate Minority Leader Billy H. Hoover (D-FL)

 

  • Replies 3
  • Created
  • Last Reply

Top Posters In This Topic

Popular Days

Top Posters In This Topic


  • Latest VGS News

    • Joe Rogan Experience #2488: "Hamas, Gaza, and the Ethics of War"   Guest: Norman Finkelstein [Opening Jingle Plays] Joe Rogan: "What's up, freaks? Welcome to the Joe Rogan Experience. Today’s episode is brought to you by Athletic Greens—get all your greens in one scoop—and by Onnit, keeping your body and mind optimized. Go to Onnit.com/JRE for 10% off everything from kettlebells to brain supplements. Alright, folks, today's gonna be... something. We’ve got a guest who’s not afraid to go where most won’t—Norman Finkelstein. Norman is an author, political scientist, and a guy who has been pissing people off for decades with his takes on Israel, Palestine, and U.S. foreign policy. Some of you will agree with him, some of you will be furious, and that’s the beauty of this show. Let’s dive in. Norman, welcome to the podcast." Norman Finkelstein: "Thank you for having me, Joe. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss such a critical issue." Segment 1: The Gaza Offensive Joe Rogan: "Let’s just jump right into it. Right now, Israel’s about to launch what they’re calling their final offensive in Gaza. They’re saying this is going to ‘end Hamas for good.’ What’s your take?" Norman Finkelstein: "Well, Joe, it’s complicated. Hamas, for all its flaws—and let’s not sugarcoat it, there are many—is both a militant group and, for many Palestinians, a symbol of resistance. Israel’s strategy, on the other hand, is essentially scorched earth. They aim to obliterate Hamas, but the human cost will be catastrophic. The question we have to ask is, does this level of destruction, including the deaths of thousands of civilians, justify the goal?" Joe Rogan: "Yeah, but isn’t that kind of the nature of war? I mean, Israel’s dealing with a group that hides behind civilians, fires rockets, and uses human shields. What are they supposed to do?" Norman Finkelstein: "They have every right to defend themselves. That’s not the issue. The issue is proportionality. International law makes it clear: you can defend yourself, but not at the cost of wholesale slaughter. What’s happening now isn’t just defense; it’s punitive, and the ordinary people of Gaza are paying the price." Segment 2: Ethics of War Joe Rogan: "You mentioned proportionality. I want to ask—where do you draw the line? If you’re Israel and you’re dealing with an enemy that’s literally in the middle of civilians, do you just let them keep attacking you?" Norman Finkelstein: "War is never clean, but the principles of proportionality and distinction exist for a reason. You target combatants, not schools, not hospitals. The argument that Hamas hides among civilians doesn’t absolve Israel of its responsibility to minimize civilian casualties. What we’re seeing isn’t just ‘collateral damage.’ It’s collective punishment." Joe Rogan: "But, Norman, let me push back. You’re sitting here, safe in New York or wherever. If your kids were living under the threat of rockets, wouldn’t you want your government to do whatever it takes?" Norman Finkelstein: "Of course. But if my government was bombing entire neighborhoods, killing thousands of kids to stop those rockets, I’d have to ask, ‘Is this really keeping us safe, or is it sowing the seeds for more violence down the road?’ That’s the moral dilemma Israel refuses to face." Segment 3: Hamas as a Governing Entity Joe Rogan: "Let’s talk about Hamas. They’re not just a terror group; they run Gaza. So how do you deal with an enemy that’s also the government?" Norman Finkelstein: "It’s tricky, no doubt. Hamas has two faces: the militants and the administrators. Their governance is riddled with corruption and authoritarianism, but for many in Gaza, they’re also the only ones standing up to Israel. They’re flawed, but their appeal lies in their resistance to occupation. You can bomb them into the Stone Age, but you can’t bomb the idea of resistance out of the Palestinian people." Joe Rogan: "Yeah, but resistance through violence... doesn’t that just perpetuate the cycle?" Norman Finkelstein: "It does, which is why the international community has to step in. But let’s not forget: Hamas exists in part because the political process was crushed. When you close every door to peaceful solutions, what do you expect people to do? Roll over?" Segment 4: U.S. Involvement and Media Narratives Joe Rogan: "Okay, let’s bring it home. The U.S. backs Israel with billions of dollars. Does that make us complicit in what’s happening?" Norman Finkelstein: "Absolutely. Every bomb dropped on Gaza has ‘Made in the USA’ written on it. We fund this war, we arm it, and we shield Israel diplomatically. The bloodshed isn’t happening in a vacuum; it’s happening with our tacit approval." Joe Rogan: "But, to play devil’s advocate, isn’t that part of our alliance? Israel’s our closest ally in the region, right?" Norman Finkelstein: "An ally doesn’t mean a blank check. The U.S. has leverage, and we could use it to push for peace. Instead, we enable actions that violate basic human rights and destabilize the region further." Segment 5: The Human Cost Joe Rogan: "Let’s talk about the people. Civilians are getting caught in the crossfire—kids, families. How do you even begin to stop that?" Norman Finkelstein: "By demanding accountability. Israel has a responsibility to avoid targeting civilians, and Hamas has a responsibility not to use them as shields. But let’s be clear: Gaza is an open-air prison. People have nowhere to go. When bombs start falling, they’re sitting ducks." Joe Rogan: "Yeah, I can’t even imagine living like that. But doesn’t that mean Hamas is failing its own people too?" Norman Finkelstein: "Undoubtedly. Hamas’s tactics put civilians at risk. But their failures don’t absolve Israel or the U.S. of responsibility. When you have overwhelming power, you bear the greater moral burden." Closing Thoughts Joe Rogan: "Man, this is heavy stuff. Norman, I’ve gotta say, whether people agree with you or not, you’ve given us a lot to think about. What’s the takeaway here?" Norman Finkelstein: "The takeaway is simple: war dehumanizes us all. If we don’t start holding everyone accountable—Hamas, Israel, the U.S., everyone—then this cycle of violence will never end." Joe Rogan: "Alright, Norman Finkelstein, everybody. Thanks for coming on, man. This was intense but important." Norman Finkelstein: "Thank you, Joe. I appreciate the platform."
    • The Rest is History Podcast: "The End of Hamas?" [Intro Music Plays] Host 1 (Tom Holland): Hello and welcome to The Rest is History, where we dig into the past to understand today’s most pressing headlines. I’m Tom Holland. Host 2 (Dominic Sandbrook): And I’m Dominic Sandbrook. Today, we’re turning our attention to the Middle East, where Israel is preparing what it calls its “final offensive” in Gaza. Hamas, the militant group that has controlled Gaza since 2007, is reportedly on the brink of collapse. Tom, this is a moment charged with historical weight, isn’t it? Tom: It absolutely is, Dominic. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often seen as one of the defining geopolitical struggles of the modern era, with roots that stretch back to biblical times. But today, we’re going to focus on a more contemporary lens—how past military offensives and peace efforts have shaped the current moment, and what history tells us about the likelihood of Israel truly eradicating Hamas. Dominic: We’ve heard this rhetoric before, haven’t we? “The final battle,” “permanent resolution,” these are phrases that have been used countless times. In 2009, during Operation Cast Lead, and again in 2014 with Operation Protective Edge, Israel launched major offensives in Gaza with similar goals—weakening Hamas and restoring security. Yet, here we are again. Segment 1: Historical Context Tom: Let’s start with some context. Hamas emerged in the late 1980s during the First Intifada, or Palestinian uprising. It was initially supported by Israel as a counterweight to the secular Fatah movement. Yes, Dominic, that’s one of history’s little ironies. Dominic (chuckling): Indeed, Tom. It’s a classic case of unintended consequences. Israel thought that by backing an Islamist movement, they could undermine the influence of Yasser Arafat and his Palestinian Liberation Organization. Instead, they helped create a far more radical and uncompromising adversary. Tom: Hamas quickly gained popularity, particularly in Gaza, through a mix of militant resistance to Israel and social services for Palestinians. By the time they won the 2006 elections and took full control of Gaza in 2007, Hamas had become the de facto government in the territory. Dominic: And that’s when the cycle of conflict we know today really began. Israel imposed a blockade on Gaza, and Hamas responded with rocket fire. This led to the kind of asymmetric warfare that has characterized the conflict ever since—Israel with its military might and Hamas using guerilla tactics and human shields. Segment 2: The Military Dimension Dominic: Now, let’s talk about Israel’s strategy. Tom, do you think this “final offensive” can truly end Hamas’s presence in Gaza? Tom: History would suggest otherwise, Dominic. Decapitating a militant group like Hamas—removing its leadership and infrastructure—is one thing. But eradicating its ideology, its support base, is an entirely different challenge. Take the examples of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka or the IRA in Northern Ireland. Both were eventually defeated militarily, but their causes lived on in various forms. Dominic: It’s also worth noting that Hamas is deeply embedded in Gaza’s society. They’re not just fighters; they run schools, hospitals, and charities. This gives them a level of legitimacy and support that’s hard to dismantle with bombs and bullets. Tom: Exactly. And even if Hamas is militarily defeated, other groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad could step into the vacuum. Or worse, the power vacuum could lead to total chaos, as we’ve seen in Libya or post-Saddam Iraq. Segment 3: The Humanitarian and International Implications Dominic: Of course, the humanitarian toll of this offensive cannot be ignored. Gaza is one of the most densely populated areas in the world, and every military strike risks civilian casualties. Historically, how has this shaped international opinion? Tom: Well, Dominic, Israel has always walked a tightrope in terms of global perception. On one hand, its right to defend itself against rocket attacks is widely acknowledged. On the other, images of civilian suffering often turn public opinion against it. This has been a recurring theme since at least the 1982 Lebanon War. Dominic: And what about the role of external powers? The U.S. has historically been Israel’s staunchest ally, but in recent years we’ve seen a more complex dynamic. Presidents Biden, Allred, and Van Horn’s administration have generally been supportive but have also emphasized the need for restraint. Tom: Yes, and then there’s the elephant in the room: the Arab world. While many Arab states have normalized relations with Israel in recent years, their populations remain deeply sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. A prolonged or especially bloody offensive could strain these new alliances. Segment 4: What Comes Next? Dominic: So, Tom, what does history tell us about the likely aftermath of this offensive? Tom: If we look at past Israeli operations, we can expect a few things. First, Hamas will likely survive in some form, even if only as a shadow of its former self. Second, there will be calls for reconstruction in Gaza, with international donors stepping in to rebuild what was destroyed. And third, we’re likely to see renewed calls for a two-state solution, even if that seems as elusive as ever. Dominic: And let’s not forget the long-term psychological toll. For every militant killed, there’s the risk of creating new generations of resentment and hostility. As one Israeli general once put it, “You can’t bomb an ideology.” Closing Thoughts Tom: Dominic, it’s clear that while this offensive may mark a turning point, it’s unlikely to be the end of the story. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has defied resolution for decades, and this chapter, like so many before it, will likely leave a legacy of both hope and heartbreak. Dominic: Absolutely, Tom. As historians, we can only hope that future generations will look back on this moment not as another missed opportunity, but as a step toward lasting peace. Tom: And on that cautiously optimistic note, thank you for joining us on The Rest is History. If you enjoyed this episode, don’t forget to subscribe and leave us a review. We’ll see you next time. [Outro Music Plays]
    • IDF Prepares Final Gaza Offensive, Aiming to End Hamas Rule The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are mobilizing for what Israeli officials are calling a “final offensive” to dismantle Hamas's control of Gaza. Following years of relentless conflict and the devastating toll of Hamas's actions on both Israeli and Palestinian civilians, this operation is being positioned as the decisive effort to ensure long-term peace and security for Israel and its people. A Strategic Operation According to sources close to Israeli Prime Minister Benny Gantz, the offensive will focus on targeting the remaining Hamas strongholds and dismantling the group’s infrastructure. Israeli intelligence estimates that Hamas has approximately 16,000 fighters left in Gaza, with 3,500 classified as “elite” troops. However, recent IDF operations have depleted Hamas’s resources, leaving the group disorganized and leaderless. The death of Mohammed Sinwar, brother of top Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, at the hands of Israeli special forces, has further disrupted Hamas's leadership structure. Israeli officials believe that without organized leadership, Hamas’s forces will be unable to sustain prolonged resistance. “This is not just about defeating a terrorist organization; this is about ensuring that Hamas never again poses a threat to the people of Israel or the broader region,” an Israeli defense official told Fox News on condition of anonymity. Swift and Decisive Action The final assault is expected to unfold rapidly, with military experts predicting that Israel’s overwhelming firepower and precise targeting will bring the operation to a close within days. “The IDF has honed its tactics over years of counterterrorism operations,” said Colonel Avi Rabinovich, a retired Israeli military strategist. “This operation is designed to permanently eliminate Hamas’s ability to wage war.” Israel’s approach is rooted in its determination to protect its citizens from the constant threat of rocket attacks and terror operations orchestrated by Hamas. The group’s indiscriminate attacks have killed and injured countless Israelis, while its mismanagement and corruption have left Gaza’s civilian population in dire conditions. Humanitarian Concerns Despite Israel’s efforts to minimize civilian casualties through targeted strikes and warnings, the humanitarian impact on Gaza remains a significant concern. Hamas’s strategy of embedding its fighters and infrastructure within civilian areas has exacerbated the risk to non-combatants. United States Senator John Carlson (D-MN) wrote on social media: "I support the eradication of Hamas.  But so far, the ordinary people of Gaza have suffered a horrific ordeal from Israel's military actions there.  What is being done to protect children, for example?  How many more will die in this latest offensive?" Israeli officials have reiterated that their fight is with Hamas, not the people of Gaza. “We are doing everything possible to protect innocent lives while achieving our military objectives,” said a spokesperson for the IDF. Global Reactions The international community has been closely monitoring the escalating situation. While the United States and other allies have expressed support for Israel’s right to self-defense, some humanitarian organizations have called for restraint. Israeli Prime Minister Benny Gantz has emphasized that this operation is necessary for lasting peace in the region. “Hamas has brought nothing but destruction to Gaza and terror to Israel. We owe it to our people—and to the future of Gaza—to end this cycle of violence,” Gantz said in a statement. Looking Ahead The anticipated success of this offensive could mark the end of Hamas’s reign in Gaza and open the door to new possibilities for the region. Israeli leaders have signaled a willingness to work with international partners to stabilize Gaza and provide humanitarian aid once the fighting ends. While the path forward remains uncertain, one thing is clear: Israel is determined to ensure that Hamas never again threatens its sovereignty or the safety of its people. As the IDF prepares to take decisive action, the world watches to see whether this operation will bring an end to years of bloodshed and pave the way for a more stable future.   ((Players mentioned: @Indie Voter))
  • Upcoming Events

  • Recent Achievements

    • Indie Voter went up a rank
      Adept
    • DMH went up a rank
      Specialist
    • Brink earned a badge
      Harmonix Winner

×
×
  • Create New...